

10-12 April 2024

Together to Regenerate Health and Care







CHRIS JONES

CEO, BMJ







10-12 April 2024

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VIN DIWAKAR

Medical Director for Transformation, NHS England







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PENNY PEREIRA

Managing Director, Q















"The most important single change in the NHS [...] would be for it to become [...] a system devoted to continual learning and improvement of patient care, top to bottom and end to end."

Don Berwick

A promise to learn - a commitment to act, 2013








Together, to improve health and care



Q is led by the Health Foundation and supported by partners across the UK and Ireland







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


GABBY MATHEWS, AMY EDMONDSON, DON BERWICK














THE PROBLEM WITH THE FAILURE FAD







When failure is "off limits"



HYPOTHETICAL CAUSES OF FAILURE







Question: What **percent** of failures in your organization get *treated* as if caused by blameworthy acts?





Basic Failures





Complex Failures





Intelligent Failures



The right kind of wrong

Air Florida Flight 90: January 13, 1982



First Officer: Pitot heat.

Captain: On.

First Officer: Anti-ice.

Captain: Off.

First Officer: APU.

Captain: Running.

First Officer: Start levers.

Captain: Idle.

BASIC ≠ **SMALL**





Because the pilot was a success!


Your pilots should fail. (Yes, fail)

Essential diagnostic questions

- 1. Is the pilot being tested under typical circumstances?
- 2. Is the goal of the pilot to learn as much as possible?
- 3. Is it clear that compensation and performance reviews are not based on a successful outcome of the *pilot*?
- 4. Were explicit **changes** made as a result of the pilot?



The new service launch fiasco was not the right kind of wrong.



FOUR AND A HALF ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENT FAILURE





It takes place in new territory



With a credible opportunity to advance toward a desired goal




Informed by available knowledge; (hypothesisdriven)



The failure is no larger than needed to gain the new knowledge



Bonus: The failure's lessons are identified, shared, & used







Basic Failures



Complex Failures



Intelligent Failures



The right kind of wrong



TORREY CANYON 1967

"Many little things added up to one big disaster ... "


- 1. time pressure
- 2. missing copy of standard maritime manual
- 3. the Captain had stayed up late
- 4. ocean currents and wind pushed the ship slightly off course overnight
- 5. first officer changed course without permission
- 6. two lobster boats suddenly appeared out of ...
- 7. the fog
- 8. a mechanical problem in the steering wheel inhibited full rudder responsiveness



AN ADVERSE DRUG EVENT AT "CHILDRENS"

"Many little things added up to one big disaster..."

- 1) Overflow conditions in the ICU the post surgical patient is transferred to a regular medical unit, with less specialized staff.
- 2) A newly graduated nurse on duty programmed the electronic infusion pump,
- 3) located in a dark corner of the room, to release the prescribed amount of morphine.
- 4) Unfamiliar with the device, the nurse asked a colleague for help.
- 5) The colleague, an experienced nurse, in a rush, stopped to help,
- 6) The concentration listed on the drug's label was partly obscured by the label being printed in the pharmacy in a way that wrapped around the cassette.
- 7) The experienced nurse used the visible information to calculate and program the machine with what she believed was the correct concentration.
- 8) The first nurse looked over the shoulder of the second to check the numbers, rather than independently carrying out his own calculations.



RETHINKING EXCELLENCE FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD





Minimize basic failures



Anticipate and mitigate complex failures



Promote and celebrate intelligent failures

Excellence means error awareness—catching and correcting error—all the way through a process or project, along with a willingness to experiment. This requires psychological safety – to make it easier for people to speak up, to take smart risks, and to shut down failing initiatives in a timely way.



PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY

A belief that the context is safe for interpersonal risks – that speaking up with ideas, questions, concerns, or failures will be welcomed and valued



PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY

is NOT:
Being Nice
Being Comfortable
Job Security
Lowering Standards



NO TRADEOFF BETWEEN HIGH STANDARDS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY



PERFORMANCE STANDARDS



CHECK YOUR RATIOS!

WHAT PERCENT OF WHAT YOU HEAR IS...

This?	Compared to this?
GOOD NEWS	BAD NEWS
AGREEMENT	DISSENT
PROGRESS	PROBLEMS
ALL'S WELL	REQUESTS FOR HELP
SUCCESS	FAILURE

If you're hearing a lot of green and not much red, beware! Red is surely happening. (And it's also part of innovation)



PROMOTE PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY

Frame the Work

Call attention to Attributes of the Work that require mutual learning

Invite Participation

Lean in to Inquiry; Make voice easy

Respond Productively

Express Appreciation, **Destigmatize Failure**, Sanction Clear Violations


FRAMING THE WORK: HIGH STAKES IN A VARIABLE CONTEXT



"I've never flown a perfect flight – and it won't happen today either. I need to hear from you.

Captain Ben Berman reframing the work with the cockpit crew







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