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Resilient healthcare: How to improve quality using insights from resilient systems and Safety II



Janet Anderson, King's College London; Al Ross, University of Glasgow



Welcome



Dr Janet Anderson

- Director, Centre for Applied Resilience in Healthcare (CARE)
- Adjunct Professor University of Stavanger, Norway
- Member of the SHARE Centre for Resilience in Healthcare, University of Stavanger, Norway
- Clinical Human Factors Group Ambassador
- Expert Human Factors adviser, Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch



Dr Al Ross

- Lecturer in Behavioural Science
- Advisor to NHS Education for Scotland
- National Advisory Board on Human Factors in Dentistry (NABHF)
- Co- Chair Human Factors Special Interest Group [SIG] of the Association for Simulated Practice in Healthcare [ASPiH]
- Dental Reference Group, Scottish Patient Safety Programme

Aims

- Introduce the principles of resilient healthcare systems and safety II
- Explore the potential of resilience for improving the quality and safety of care
- Inform about tools and methods available to assist in implementing resilience in healthcare



Our scope


- Motivation – concern with improving quality and safety and the limitations of many QI tools
- Focus on the organisation, teams, units
- This is organisational system theory – not coping skills, burnout or resilience training
- We reject the idea that resilience is a way to get more out of people or get them to do more in an under resourced or badly designed service





RESILIENCE ENGINEERING ASSOCIATION

the official home of Resilience Engineering



- Many organizations today have begun to recognize the limits of *compliance*—a model of success embodied in plans, procedures, quality indicators, risk management and automation.
- This model cannot effectively accommodate variability, disturbances, uncertainties or novelty, which is increasingly obvious in an interconnected and turbulent world.



Resilient Health Care



The Resilient Health Care
Net (RHCN) is a non-
commercial collaboration of
an international group of
researchers and practitioners
with the aim to **apply**
Resilience Engineering
principles in health care.





Traditional approach to safety - Safety I


- Reactive – aims to prevent future problems
- Humans are seen as unreliable – focus on human error
 - Errors are categorised and counted – error taxonomies, estimation of error rates, studies on human limits
- Safety is defined as absence of adverse incidents
- Parallels with medical models of illness – health as absence of illness, search for causes, removing cause results in health



Swiss cheese model



Now widely accepted clinical work is complex; not easily explained in linear terms



Problems with Safety I

- Dissatisfaction with existing models and methods for improving safety – reactive, slow progress
- Limitations of root cause analysis, incident reporting – difficulty of establishing causes, same problems often recur, highly targeted solutions with wrong focus, time consuming




Safety Science

Volume 80, December 2015, Pages 105–114



Learning from patient safety incidents in incident review meetings: Organisational factors and indicators of analytic process effectiveness

Janet E. Anderson^a, , , Naonori Kodate^{b, 1}, 

[Show more](#)

doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2015.07.012 [Get rights and content](#)

Highlights

- Learning from patient safety incidents is difficult.
- Lack of organisational support, high workload ineffective leadership hinders learning.
- Facilitating factors were participatory interactions and strong safety leadership.
- Process measures of meeting effectiveness were developed.
- Process measures highlighted important deficits in analytic effectiveness.



How do we know we are safe?

- Safety is not the absence of error
- If we rely on error rates to indicate safety we can only know how safe we were in the past
- Clinicians' ability to adapt to pressures and challenges **creates safety**
- We need to strengthen their ability to do this – strengthen adaptive capacity



Safety II – Resilient systems

- Proactive systems approach aimed at anticipating and preventing problems
- Based on the reality of clinical work –
 - Often messy, chaotic
 - Determined by social interaction and negotiation
 - Relies on co-ordination and articulation across groups, physical locations, time
- Adaptive capacity is the key to creating safe systems



Organisational resilience

- Resilience is “the intrinsic ability of a system or an organisation to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”
(Hollnagel et al Resilient health Care Vol 1; 2011, p. xxv)
- Four potentials – anticipating, monitoring, responding and learning



What is resilience? (Hollnagel)



Four attributes of resilient organisations -

1. **Respond** to regular and irregular conditions in an effective flexible manner
2. **Learn** from past events, both positive and negative, and understand correctly what happened and why
3. **Anticipate** long-term threats and opportunities
4. **Monitor** short-term developments and threats; revise risk models.



Resilience engineering

- Key concepts
 - Work as imagined is different to work as done
 - Ability to adapt and work flexibly is what creates safety
 - Safety and harm emerge from the complexity
 - We need to learn from what goes right as well as wrong



Compelling arguments

- Resonates with experience of clinical staff
 - Limitations of incident reporting
 - Focus on procedures and policies sometimes not helpful
 - Adaptation is at the heart of clinical work
 - Goal trade offs – efficiency, patient experience, effectiveness, safety




BUT.....

- What does this mean in practice for Quality Improvement?
- How can resilience and adaptive capacity be studied in the messy clinical environment?
- Potentially powerful ideas in search of practical application.....?
- Methodological guidance available but not easily translated to practice



Working model



Anderson et al. *Pilot and Feasibility Studies* (2016) 2:61
 DOI 10.1186/s40814-016-0103-x

Pilot and Feasibility Studies

STUDY PROTOCOL

Open Access



Implementing resilience engineering for healthcare quality improvement using the CARE model: a feasibility study protocol

J. E. Anderson^{1*}, A. J. Ross², J. Back¹, M. Duncan¹, P. Snell², K. Walsh¹ and P. Jaye⁵




Three short case studies

1. Older Person's Unit (OPU) in Hospital
 2. Emergency Department
 3. Dental Practice
- All based on in depth empirical work
 - Aim was to identify opportunities for improvement




1. OPU - discharge

- Co-ordination of discharge tasks across staff, agencies, families and carers is complex and time consuming
- Misalignments between demand for services post discharge and availability
- Variability due to patient factors – carers, preferences, home environment




1. OPU - discharge

- Goal trade offs are common – discharge may be speeded up because of infection, weekend approaching, or delayed because of safety concerns
- Monitoring progress towards discharge is difficult because there is no shared artefact
- Need for anticipatory monitoring of discharge actions




Potential interventions

Shared artefact/documentation to
allow collaborative monitoring of
progress towards discharge



2. Emergency Department

- Patient flow is unpredictable and difficult to manage
- Monitoring involves
 - Walk around
 - Board round
 - Sitrep meetings – 2 hourly
- Multiple adaptations – flex staff, space, processes
- Difficult to judge when to escalate



2. ED - Implications

- Opportunities for improvement
 - Making patient flow more transparent – understanding repertoire of adjustments and adaptations and under what circumstances they are successful
 - Improved monitoring of escalation actions – better targeting of actions taken during Sit.rep. meeting
 - Improved learning from what goes right – reports of previous day to include reflection on what worked and what didn't



3. Fluoride Varnish QI Project

Childsmile in
General Dental
Practice

SIGN 138 • Dental interventions to prevent caries in children

A national clinical guideline

March 2014



Healthcare
Improvement
Scotland

SIGN

Help us to improve SIGN guidelines - click here to complete our survey





Figure 21: Proportion of 2-5 year old children registered with an NHS dentist receiving at least one FVA or two or more FVAs – Scotland, 2012/13-2016/17 financial year



CARe



• Issue: fluoride varnish application in practice is variable

- Simple question: why?
- Draw from multiple data sources





Figure 32: Proportion of 2-5 year old children registered with an NHS dentist receiving at least one FVA or two or more FVAs – Scotland, by NHS Board, 2014/2015 financial year

FVA – fluoride varnish application

Childsmile evaluation monitoring data



COMMUNITY DENTIST'S ORAL EPIDEMIOLOGY

Original article
Use of the theoretical domains framework to further understanding of what influences application of fluoride varnish to children's teeth: a national survey of general dental practitioners in Scotland
Wendy Smith-Jones, Debbie Barrett, Andrea SheiFF, Srijita Sharma, David J. Connolly, Laura M. D. Macpherson

GDP surveys

(n= 1,090; n= 709)

Workshop (n= 56)




Interviews (n=43)






3. FRAM (Hollnagel)

- Resilience Engineering based
- Model of how something happens or how something works
- Based on activities or functions and how they fit together
- Growing health care applications..






Data synthesis



Childsmile in General Dental Practice

Routine monitoring data



World café workshop (n=56)



Stratified practitioner interviews



(n= 36)

Questionnaire studies
(n= 1,090; n= 709)

Category of risk application	Adjusted P (95% CI)	RR ^a A ^b	P	P ^c
Isolated case and				
• at of professional	important part of professional work	0.13 (0.07 to 0.24)		
• at of professional role		0.38		
• ability to ensure in	his responsibility to ensure in practice	0.08 (0.02 to 0.32)		
• communication				
• in professional	Applying P ^d is essential	0.12 (0.07 to 0.20)		
• in necessary	Applying P ^d is essential	0.18 (0.10 to 0.33)		
• giving P ^d in the				
• which outweigh the				
• cases				
• to ensure the risk				
• for the (see)	Is not a priority for the (see)	0.06 (0.03 to 0.12)		
• checklist				
• checklist for the (see)				
• checklist				
• checklist for the (see)				
• reported by research				
• I receive appropriate				
• in the				
• in the practice if it				
• actually occurred				
		68%	0	35.4%


Key Informant interviews (n= 7)

FRAM synthesis




CARe

Nobody said it was easy!





Publication




Applied Ergonomics 68 (2018) 294–303



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Applied Ergonomics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apergo



A systems approach using the functional resonance analysis method to support fluoride varnish application for children attending general dental practice



Al Ross^{a,*}, Andrea Sherriff^a, Jamie Kidd^a, Wendy Gnich^a, Janet Anderson^b, Leigh Deas^c, Lorna Macpherson^a

^a Glasgow Dental School, School of Medicine, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, 378 Sauchiehall Street, Glasgow, G2 3JZ, UK

^b Florence Nightingale Faculty of Nursing and Midwifery, King's College London, James Clerk Maxwell Building, 57 Waterloo Road, London SE1 8WA, UK

^c Public Dental Services, NHS Lanarkshire, Hospital Street, Coatbridge, ML5 4DN, UK



TABLE EXERCISE [15 MINUTES]

- Aim: to look at care from a Resilient Health Care perspective
- **Read the one-page description** of an episode of care, investigation and actions taken
- **Discuss the events** at your tables We have provided questions
 - We will circulate round the room
- Then we will have **open discussion**



Questions or comments?






Takeaways.....

- Establish a clear focus for an RH project
 - Reduce adverse events, training, introduce new systems, improve patient flow etc.
- Focus on activity and challenges not non compliance
- Focus on how things work (both well and badly)
- Consider how to support work as done
 - Allow flexibility within safe limits
 - Design to make it easy for people; reduce unwanted variation
- Safety II incorporates and extends Safety I



Some resources...

<http://game.resiliencecentre.org.uk/>



McNab D, McKay J, Shorrock S, Luty S, Bowie P. The development and application of 'systems thinking' principles to improve everyday work in healthcare. SKIRC Technical Report: NHS Education for Scotland, Edinburgh, March 2019.

Conclusions..

- Resilient healthcare is still developing but has potential to -
 - Deepen our understanding of **clinical work as done and why it is difficult**
 - Improve intervention design
 - Increase sustainability of interventions
 - Increase staff QI engagement

Please get in touch

Please fill in the further contact sheet if you are interested

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Resilient healthcare: How to improve quality using insights from resilient systems and Safety II



Tapadh leibh!!

